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The Perfect Storm: Sandy, New Jersey Land Use, and the National Flood Insurance Program

“Natural disasters, of course, are not “natural.” They are catastrophic events that result
from the interaction of natural hazards and human presence.”1
I.

INTRODUCTION
Residents of New Jersey understand that the shore is a large part of the state’s identity.

The New Jersey shore was the first heavily developed beach in the country, paving the way for
the future shore culture that would develop.2 Many New Jerseyans have fond memories of
spending their summers in the surf and sand, vacationing in any of the hundreds of coastal
communities. Development of the coastal land in a highly densely populated state has exploded
since the 1800s.3
The population of New Jersey is also painfully aware of the destructive forces that lurk
just off the coast. Hurricane Sandy swept homes off of their foundations, the ocean crossed entire
barrier islands, and boardwalks fell into the sea.4 Seawalls have been constructed and beaches
constantly replenished in order to protect coastal structures from storm surges5, but these
protective actions can only do so much. While Sandy made landfall at what could arguably have
been the worst moment in the tidal schedule, during both high and spring tide6, it was actions
taken by both New Jersey and the federal government that caused the most destruction.

1

Rutherford H. Platt, Learning from Disasters: The Synergy of Law and Geography 38 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS &
ANALYSIS, 10150, 10152 (2008).
2
See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
3
ORRIN H. PILKEY & KATHARINE L. DIXON, THE CORPS AND THE SHORE 1 (1996).
4
Chris Kirkham & John Rudolf, Jersey Shore Development Failures Exposed by Hurricane Sandy, HUFFINGTON
POST (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/11/jersey-shore-development_n_2267557.html.
5
See infra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
6
See infra note 90.
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With the explosion in land development and the subsequent destruction of the beaches,
New Jersey took action with a land management plan called the Coastal Area Facility Review
Act (CAFRA).7 First enacted to regulate industrial development, over time CAFRA was
increasingly used to protect the shore from residential expansion.8 The problem, however, were
the loopholes contained within the Act that were exploited by municipalities seeking to increase
tax revenue through increased construction.9 Local politics combined with a past lack of
appreciation for the dangers of coastal living present obstacles to changing the problems
associated with the poor land use decisions propagated by CAFRA.
Further exacerbating the problem of over-development in dangerous coastal flood areas is
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) operated flood insurance program, known
as the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).10 This insurance program foresaw that flood
insurance premium rates would be subsidized in order to make premiums more affordable so that
a greater percentage of the population would participate in the program.11 This in turn led to a
decrease in the price of beach property due to taxpayers picking up some of the risk associated
with coastal living.12 The structure of the NFIP prevents these issues from being addressed and
only a major overhaul of the program can cure these ills.

7

Construction of Facility in Coastal Area; Permit; Exceptions, N.J. STAT. ANN. §13:19-5 (1993).
See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
9
See infra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
10
National Flood Insurance Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§4011-4032 (2012).
11
National Flood Insurance Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §4014(a)(1) (2012).
12
See infra notes 122-124and accompanying text.
8
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II.

NEW JERSEY’S CURRENT LAND USE STRUCTURE COMBINED WITH THE
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM HAS CONTRIBUTED TO RISKY
COASTAL LAND DEVELOPMENT.
On October 29, 2012, Hurricane Sandy brought heavy rains, strong winds, and powerful

storm surges to the New Jersey shore.13 New Jersey land use laws as well as the National Flood
Insurance Program produced risky coastal development which placed property and lives in the
way of coastal storms. After these structures were built, coastal residents and businesses tried to
protect their investments by building hard edifices and replenishing the eroding beaches. The
result of these actions often led to both their money and sand on their beaches washing away.
This was due solely to nature and how beach stabilization affects the shore.
A.

THE BEACH IS A MOVING BODY OF UNCONSOLIDATED LAND WHICH
SHIFTS DUE TO THE FORCES OF NATURE, REGARDLESS OF MAN
MADE STRUCTURES.

Before investigating the issues created by the policies that encourage risky development
in coastal flood areas, one must have an understanding of exactly what a beach is and its role in
relation to the continental mainland. Beaches are extraordinary bodies of land that are constantly
moving, shifting and changing. They form at the meetings of sea and land and consist of
unconsolidated material.14 Given that these strips of land are situated adjacent to one of the most
powerful forces on the planet, the shore is subjected to fierce winds, pounding waves, and strong

13

Chrstina Ng, Superstorm Sandy Crashes Ashore in New Jersey, ABC NEWS (Oct. 29, 2012),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/hurricane-sandy-makes-landfall-jersey/story?id=17592795#.UXmKrrUsmf4
14
This material is separated into three distinct categories based on grain size of the material that comprise the beach.
Beaches can either be made up of sand, gravel, or boulders. These materials can be further broken down. For
example sand can either be made from volcanic material such as in Hawaii, coral as in Bermuda, or quartz such as in
the beaches of Cape Cod. Beaches can further be distinguished by the size and force of their waves such as beaches
that are high energy, moderate energy, or low energy. PILKEY &. DIXON, supra note 3, at 20,22.
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tides.15 It is the meeting of these great forces combined with the makeup of a beach that makes
its function so critical. One of the most important functions of a beach is that it acts as a buffer
between a coastal state and the forces of the sea, bending and twisting to absorb the strength of
waves and wind.16 The importance of this role is amplified by the presence of a coastal storm
which threatens the interior of a state.17 The combination of wave energy, sand, beach shape,
and sea level allow beaches to move and carry out the important function of a shock absorber.18
Each beach is unique in size, shape, location, and composition. This distinctiveness means that
each beach protects inland regions differently.
The New Jersey shore owes its form to one of the most distinct types of beach: the barrier
islands. As their name indicates, barrier islands protect continental lands from the sea and its
accompanying forces.19 A barrier island is a thin ribbon of sand that runs parallel to the coast.20
In order for these types of beaches to form, four conditions must be present.21 The first condition
is that sea levels must be rising.22 Secondly, the beach must be a part of a coastal plain, defined

15

See id. at 20.
“It retreats when things get tough during a storm and returns when the weather is calm. It shapes itself to best
absorb the pounding storm waves and forms a different shape when the waves are small.” Id.
17
The beach flattens during a storm by moving sand from the upper beach to the
lower beach. Flattening allows the wave energy of the breaking storm waves to
be dissipated over a broadened surface relative to the beach before the storm.
After the storm passes, much of the sand will return over ensuing months and
years.
Id. at 22.
18
When any of these four factors changes, the others adjust. For example, when wave energy increases due to a
storm, there is a temporary increase in sea level. The wave energy shifts sand according to its composition and
quantity. The moving sand changes the shape, size, and location of the beach. The rise in sea level allows the sea to
reach further inland, changing dunes and bluffs. The interaction between these four factors is called a beaches
“dynamic equilibrium”. Id. at 23.
19
WALLACE KAUFMAN & ORRIN H. PILKEY, JR., THE BEACHES ARE MOVING 113 (1998).
20
PRINCETON WORDNET, http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=barrier%20island (last visited Mar. 20,
2013).
21
PILKEY & DIXON, supra note 3, at 15.
22
Sea levels began to rise at the end of the last ice age, approximately 18,000 years ago. As the sea level began to
rise, coastal plains were flooded and the sea extended miles into continents. The ocean began to fill in ridge flanked
valleys. Over time, these ridges eroded and turned to sand. Storms most likely cut through this sand and separated
what was once one ridge into separate independent islands. Id. at 15-16.
16
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as a low flat surface that extends to the sea.23 The third condition that must be present for the
formation of barrier islands is the existence of a large supply of sand.24 Without a large supply,
sand could not accumulate into island formations.25 The final condition that must exist is the
presence of waves which are large and powerful enough to shift large quantities of sand
around.26 If these four conditions were not present, the barrier islands that make up the New
Jersey shore would not exist.27
While every type of beach is dynamic in nature, bending and moving to the forces of
wind and sea, barrier islands are beaches that are mobile to an extreme. Due to rising sea levels,
barrier islands are subject to a process called “island migration”.28 Island migration occurs when
sand on the ocean side of the island washes over it and moves towards the mainland.29 In a sense,
the island rolls over itself and moves closer to the continental land mass.30 Island migration is a
natural process that aids in protecting continental lands; the barrier island moves landward as the
mainland retreats in the face of rising ocean levels, allowing the island to absorb energy
produced by the sea that would normally reach the interior.31 Natural processes, such as island
migration, are not inherently damaging. It’s only when humans interact with these processes that

23

Id. at 15.
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
For example, Florida has large quantities of sand, is located on a coastal plain, and is subject to rising sea levels.
However, the coast of Florida is missing the requisite large waves for the creation of barrier islands. The result is
that the large supply of sand off the coast does not move inland and form islands. Id. at 15-16.
28
Id. at 16.
29
KAUFMAN & PILKEY JR., supra note 19, at 96.
30
The ocean side of the island retreats as storms push sand across the island to
form overwash fans. Overwash fans, which often extend into the lagoon behind
the island, may cause the island to widen in a landward direction. Simultaneous
shoreline retreat of the open-ocean side of the island results in island migration.”
PILKEY & DIXON, supra note 3, at 16.
31
While island migration is a naturally occurring process, human forces may interrupt and negatively affect this
procedure. As sea levels continue to rise, as they have within the past century, both sides of barrier islands appear to
be disappearing due to the process of erosion. It is believed that this dual side erosion is being caused by rising sea
levels which is thought by some to be a result of human actions. Id. at 20.
24
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disasters result. When a coastal storm hits New Jersey and the beach attempts to retreat and roll
over itself, it is met with homes, businesses, seawalls, and highways.32
While the sea threatens to take New Jersey’s beaches and barrier islands roll over
themselves through the process of island migration, buildings continue to rise from the sand and
people are forced to protect their investments and lives from natural processes. While this paper
focuses primarily on land use management and the subsidies created by flood insurance, there
are coastal protection systems available to shore communities and they are often implemented in
in an attempt to keep the sea at bay, sand on the beaches, and buildings standing. This paper
briefly discusses these coastal protection devices in order to gain a clearer vision of the beach
and its coastal communities.
The most visible of the coastal protection devices are hard stabilization structures which
include man-made structures such as seawalls and groins.33 Hard stabilization involves erecting
structures to shield the shoreline and hold it in place.34 The most widely used form of hard
stabilization is the seawall, a structure built to run parallel to the coast.35 While seawalls are
highly effective tools to combat the destruction of coastal structures, they often destroy the very
thing that draws people to the shore, the beach.36 Whereas a beach absorbs the energy created by
waves by way of moving, seawalls are stationary objects that do not yield until broken or
breached. This causes the sand in front of the wall to move further out to sea and accelerates

32

See id. at 34.
PILKEY & DIXON, supra note 3, at 38.
34
Id.
35
The size and make up of seawalls varies almost as much as the types of beaches. They can be constructed of
wood, concrete, rock, tires, or various other types of materials. They are tall and short, large and small. See id.
36
Besides destroying the beach, seawalls also impose other negatives on coastal living. Due to their very nature,
seawalls are permanent structures. They cannot be torn down without great expense. Therefore, seawalls cannot
change with the engineering landscape when it comes to coastal protection. On the aesthetic front, seawalls are not
very pleasant to view. They ruin the uninterrupted view of nature and are often made from unattractive material.
33
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erosion of the beaches on both ends of the wall.37 Groins are another example of a hard stabilizer
used to protect structures by preventing erosion from taking sections of beach. Unlike seawalls
which are built parallel to the shore line, groins are built perpendicular, jutting out into the
ocean.38 The purpose of a groin is to trap sand in a certain area and stop erosion of a particular
portion of the beach.39 This occurs because of the long shore flow of sand which allows the
beach to function as if it were a river of sand.40 While a groin does its job as prescribed, it does
so at the detriment to neighboring areas of beach.41 Although seawall and groin type structures
do provide a function, the consequence of their use is further destruction of the beach, the one
thing standing between the mainland and the power of the ocean.
Soft stabilization of the beach consists of beach replenishment which involves nourishing
the beach with sand exported from other areas.42 The purpose of this process is to replace the
sand that had been removed from the beach due to erosion.43 Often, this erosion is a consequence
of rising sea levels or the construction of manmade objects.44 This method of coastal protection
has been successful and many beaches continue to exist through replenishment, but the cost is

37

Wave energy is intensified rather than dissipated, so even more sand is swept
offshore to the continental shelf. This direct participation of a seawall in the
degradation of a beach is called active loss. As the beach narrows in front of the
wall, reducing the available beach area, the amount of sand transported past the
wall in both directions is reduced because the smaller surface area of the surf
zone. The reduction leads to erosion on adjacent shoreline reaches.
PILKEY & DIXON, supra note 3, at 40.
38
KARL F. NORDSTROM ET AL., LIVING WITH THE NEW JERSEY SHORE 35 (1986).
39
Id.
40
The various forces at work where the land meets the sea, particularly wind and waves, keep the sand in motion.
Longshore currents then take this suspended sand and move it in the direction that the water travelling. These
currents are often formed when waves strike the beach at an angle less than 90 degrees. As the sand moves along
this “river”, it gets deposited to the beaches down the current. See generally PILKEY & DIXON, supra note 3, at 2930.
41
NEW JERSEY DEP’T OF ENVTL., I NEW JERSEY SHORE PROTECTION MASTER PLAN PROT., 224.N5N47, ch. 2 at 2
(1981).
42
This sand often comes from offshore sand deposits, inlet tidal deltas, or another beach located further upland.
PILKEY & DIXON, supra note 3, at 49.
43
Id.
44
See e.g. id. at 13, 43.
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extraordinarily high.45 These projects must continue indefinitely as sea levels continue to rise.46
Furthermore, there can be no definite schedule to when a beach needs to be replenished due to
sand loss.47 Replacing sand that has been lost on a beach is a time consuming and expensive
enterprise requiring time for planning.48 However, science will never advance to a point where
large storms, that strip beaches of sand, can be predicted and incorporated into this planning
schedule.49 So while humans have engineered ways to prevent our beaches from eroding, money
will need to be spent for an indefinite amount of time to keep these programs operating.
B.

NEW JERSEY LAND USE REGULATION AND THE COAST

Both hard and soft stabilization act as band aids on a wound rather than trying to prevent
the cut from occurring in the first place. Worse still, while protecting structures that have been
constructed on the beach over decades, hard stabilization tends to destroy the very beach which
attracted people to New Jersey over two hundred years ago. The only one-hundred percent
effective way to protect the structures located in coastal flood plains is to manage the land and
prevent or limit certain types of construction.
1.

PRE CAFRA: “‘I KNOW EVERY INCH OF THIS PLACE, EVERY
ROCK, TREE, WEED, AND FOLD OF THE EARTH.’ NO ONE CAN
SAY THAT ABOUT THE SHORELINE OR THE BEACHES.”50

Before there were the glitzy art deco buildings of Miami, long before the Gulf Coast was
transformed into a tourist’s paradise, there was the New Jersey shore. The wealthy from New
NEW JERSEY DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., supra note 41, at 4.
As sea levels continue to rise, the ocean will swallow up larger sections of the beach. As this occurs, coastal
communities will be forced to constantly replace the lost sand. Id.
47
Id.
48
See generally PILKEY & DIXON, supra note 3, at 76.
49
PILKEY & DIXON, supra note 3, at 91-92.
50
KAUFMAN & PILKEY JR., supra note 19, at 12.
45
46
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York and Pennsylvania flocked to the shore to cool off in the summer months.51 It was due to
this influx of wealth that the New Jersey shore was the first comprehensively developed beach in
America.52 On July 1, 1801, the first advertisement appeared for the New Jersey shore in the
Philadelphia Aurora.53 The advertisement proclaimed the beauty of the shore while also
foreshadowing the numerous modern beach resorts that would come to exist.54 However, the
realization of heavy development was met with negative consequences.
The success of the New Jersey shore would lead to the beach’s downfall. Just as the shore
was becoming a popular vacation destination, owners of tourist establishments began to notice
that their investments were vulnerable to great natural forces.55 Owners began to construct
seawalls and groins in order to protect coastal buildings from storm surges created by coastal
storms.56 As previously discussed, the thought behind constructing these hard stabilizers was to
protect the buildings on the barrier islands from powerful waves and storm surges.57 The
consequence of the construction of seawalls and groins was the destruction of the beaches.58
New Jersey turned into a model on how not to develop a beach, leading to the formation of the
term “New Jerseyization” of coastlines.59 Concerns stemming from the “New Jerseyization” of
the shore paired with the exponential growth of communities all along the beach caused the U.S.

51

PILKEY & DIXON, supra note 3, at 1.
Id.
53
R. CRAIG KOEDEL, SOUTH JERSEY HERITAGE: A SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL HISTORY 105 (1979).
54
See id.
55
PILKEY &. DIXON, supra note 3, at 1.
56
Id.
57
See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
58
Efforts to armor coastlines with seawalls often had the opposite effect,
increasing erosion as waves crashed into hard structures and carried more sand
away. Jetties and groins trapped sand in some place along the coast, yet they
also robbed nearby beaches of incoming sand, causing even greater deterioration
of shorelines.
Kirkham & Rudolf, supra note 4, at 3.
59
“New Jerseyization eventually became the term used for the process of stemming erosion at the price of the
beach.” PILKEY &. DIXON, supra note 3, at 1.
52

9

Matthew Oorbeek 10

Army Corps of Engineers to classify 81 percent of New Jersey’s coastline as being in “critical”
condition from beach erosion.60 As with other disaster mitigation programs, coastal land
management is largely reactive and driven by disaster.61 In 1973, the government of the State of
New Jersey recognized that explosive growth mixed with eroding beaches was a disaster that
needed to be dealt with through land management.
2.

NEW JERSEY FAILED TO REGULATE COASTAL RESIDENTIAL
DEVELOPMENT WITH THE COASTAL AREA FACILITY REVIEW
ACT DUE TO THE GROWTH OF THE TWENTY FOUR UNIT
DEVELOPMENTS.

When explosive growth occurs in a previously undeveloped area, government often does
not see the immediate need to regulate land use due to unrecognized dangers. However,
hindsight is 20/20 and emergencies and disasters often bring these threats to the public eye. This
is often the time when government steps in and attempts to fix the problems retroactively that
human development created. This occurred in the days following the Great Fire of London in
1666 to as recently as Hurricane Sandy.62 Fast forward to New Jersey in 1973; after decades of
exponential growth, New Jersey legislators realized the need for coastal land management if the
New Jersey shore was going to survive for future generations. However, regulation could not
unduly burden these tax revenue generating towns. Enter the Coastal Area Facility Review Act

60

Kirkham & Rudolf, supra note 4, at 3.
PILKEY &. DIXON, supra note 3, at 2.
62
London was a financial success but a geographic disaster waiting to happen: Private
structures clogged the narrow lanes and passageways, encroached on market spaces, and
blocked access to the Thames River. With no regulation of building size, location, and
construction materials, the fire was inevitable. And without access to water, it could not
be halted. …King Charles II issued an astounding proclamation a week after the disaster
calling for restraint and foresight in the rebuilding process, pending a full investigation of
the causes of the disaster. ...The king then appointed a Royal Commission…to study the
causes of the disaster and to draft a Parliamentary law to codify rules for rebuilding. The
resulting Act for Rebuilding London adopted on February 8, 1667, has been described as
London’s first “Complete code of building regulations.
Platt, supra note 1, at 10150.
61
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(CAFRA). Like all government regulations, CAFRA had to delicately balance the interests of
protecting the coastal environment while also encouraging prosperous and responsible coastal
development.63 Interestingly enough, CAFRA’s main objective was not to protect the beach from
residential and commercial development, but in the decades that followed, amendments to the
law would focus heavily on these issues.64 Nevertheless, having recognized that coastal
construction was affecting the beach, the legislature sought to regulate certain types of residential
development.65
In its 1973 iteration, CAFRA regulated commercial and industrial development as well as
new housing developments with 25 or more dwelling units.66 These regulations came in the form
of requiring certain types of land development, as described in the statute, to apply and receive a
permit from the State. CAFRA was fairly successful in regulating commercial and industrial
development around the New Jersey shore, but the regulation of residential construction was not
as successful. Municipalities were able to take advantage of CAFRA due to their power to zone

63

[T]o encourage the development of compatible land uses in order to improve
the overall economic position of the inhabitants of that area within the
framework of a comprehensive environmental design strategy which preserves
the most ecologically sensitive and fragile area from inappropriate development
and provides adequate environmental safeguards for the construction of any
facilities in the coastal area.
Conservation and Development-Parks and Reservations, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:19-2 (1993).
64
“The impetus for the enactment of CAFRA in 1973 came from several proposals for industrial development along
the New Jersey coastline to support proposed offshore oil and gas exploration. These proposed projects would have
dramatically reduced the recreational benefits of the coastal area.” Michael J. Gross & Jeffrey S. Beenstock,
Implications of the new CAFRA Legislation, NEW JERSEY LAWYER, THE MAGAZINE, April 1995, at 13, 13.
65
[T]hat certain portions of the coastal area are now suffering serious adverse
environmental effects resulting from existing facility activity impacts that would
preclude or tend to preclude those multiple uses which support diversity and are
in the best long-term, social, economic, aesthetic and recreational interests of all
people of the State.
Conservation and Development-Parks and Reservations, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:19-2 (1993).
66
Gross & Beenstock, supra note 64, at 13.
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under what is called “home rule”.67 Therefore, while new residential developments with 25 or
more dwellings were required to gain state approval before building was to commence, the
municipalities could zone areas for fewer than 25 residential dwellings and allow construction to
take place without fear of state intervention. The combination of the high growth rates of the
shore plus the opportunity for increased tax revenue led to the creation of the “24 unit
development”.68 The result was that CAFRA had barely made a blip in the residential growth
rate at the New Jersey shore. It was not for the lack of trying; it was made clear through the
Department of Environmental Protection’s failed attempts at regulating construction by the shore
that CAFRA would need to be amended.69
3.

NEW JERSEY GETS SERIOUS: CAFRA’S 1993 AMENDMENT

Due to the sudden increase of 24 unit developments and the apparent failure in ability to
regulate coastal residential construction, CAFRA was in dire need of an amendment to close its
loopholes. Understandably, municipalities and other coastal interests were against making
changes to CAFRA and allowing the state to further regulate land use. It took a combination of
damaging natural events to shift the tide in favor of fixing CAFRA.70 The businesses and
homeowners of the Jersey shore coalesced and forced a compromise; the 24 unit loophole would
be closed in specified areas of CAFRA71 enforcement but the absolute right to rebuild following
Home rule is defined as “Power granted either by the Constitution or Legislature or both to municipal
governments to organize themselves to carry out a range of governmental activities under their own authority and to
preserve health, safety, and general welfare”. Power to Zone, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-62 (1983).
68
Kirkham & Rudolf, supra note 4, at 3.
69
See Gross & Beenstock, supra note 64, at 13-14. See generally Dept. of Envtl. Prot. v. Stavola, 103 N.J. 425
(1986)
70
The early 1990’s saw large algae blooms sustained by polluted waters off the New Jersey coast, prompting many
beaches in the state to close. The combination of algae blooms and powerful nor’easters forced New Jersey to take
action. See Kirkham & Rudolf, supra note 4, at 5.
71
The new CAFRA legislation separated the regulated coastal area into four geographic locations: (1) beaches and
dunes; (2) 150 feet landward from the mean high water line; (3) the landward area between 150 feet and 500 feet
from the mean high water line; and (4) any area of CAFRA jurisdiction beyond 500 feet of the mean high water line.
67
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storms came into being.72 This absolute right to rebuild was included in the 1993 CAFRA
compromise even though the DEP knew the destruction that storms could cause to coastal
communities as early as 1981.73 While shorefront regulation is primarily in the hands of
municipalities given their power to zone, the 1993 CAFRA amendment shifted some of this
responsibility to the state. However, with the right to rebuild, this responsibility would be
arduous to exercise. Furthermore, insurance was needed to protect the large amount of homes
that now had the unfettered right to rebuild following a natural disaster.
C.

THE NFIP: NATIONALIZING FLOOD INSURANCE

Flood insurance as we currently know it did not exist until 1968 with the passage of the
National Flood Insurance Act.74 After large floods of the Missouri River destroyed lands
spreading from St. Joseph, Missouri and Sioux Falls, Iowa in 1956, President Eisenhower
attempted to initiate a nationalized flood insurance program.75 However, Congress never funded
the proposal for fear that subsidized insurance would draw people into these flood plains instead
A permit is required for all development on beaches and dunes. For the area between the mean high water line and
150 feet landward, a CAFRA permit is required for a residential development with 3 or more dwellings, a
commercial development with 5 or more parking spaces, and any public or industrial development. Development in
the geographic area between 150 feet and 500 feet from the mean high water line requires a CAFRA permit for a
residential development with at least 25 dwellings, a commercial development with 50 or more parking spaces, and
any public or industrial development. For the remaining areas under CAFRA jurisdiction beyond 500 feet of the
mean high water line, a CAFRA permit is required for any residential development with at least 75 dwelling units, a
commercial development with 150 or more parking spaces, and any public or industrial development. Construction
of Facility in Coastal Area; Permit; Exceptions, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:19-5 (1993).
72
Construction of Facility in Coastal Area; Permit; Exceptions, N.J. STAT. ANN. §13:19-5.2(b) (1993).
73
Hurricanes and northeasters traveling along the New Jersey coast have damaged
beaches and shore development throughout recorded history. Since 1900, the
Atlantic and Gulf coast barrier islands have been affected by more than 100
hurricanes. Although hurricanes account for most of the damages along the New
Jersey coast, 35 to 40 winter storms (northeasters) each year have enough force
to erode beaches.
NEW JERSEY DEPT. OF ENVTL. PROT., 224.N5N47, NEW JERSEY SHORE PROTECTION MASTER PLAN Vol. I Ch. I at 39
(1981).
74
National Flood Insurance Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4001-4130 (1968).
75
Christine A. Klein & Sandra B. Zellmer, Mississippi River Stories: Lessons from a Century of Unnatural
Disasters, 60 SMU L. REV. 1471, 1488-89 (2007).
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of keeping them away.76 With the apparent ability to look forward in time, that Congress foresaw
what would occur with the current National Flood Insurance Program and land development in
the coastal flood plains of the New Jersey shore.
As far as government involvement goes, second to land use regulations, flood insurance
is the strongest driver of coastal development. The skepticism following the previous statement
is understandable.77 However, flood insurance does not operate as other types of insurance does.
Unlike different categories of insurance, private insurance companies are not able to profitably
issue flood insurance.78 Given flood insurance’s impracticability in the private sector, the federal
government enacted The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 which provided federalsubsidized flood insurance.79 This act created the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)
which falls under the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) authority.80 In order to
combat the high prices which resulted in private flood insurance being unworkable, the NFIP
would charge policy holders a lower than market rate premium.81 Given this subsidized rate,
premiums paid by policy holders do not reflect the actual risk of flooding even though the rates
are closer to the actuarial rate than they have been in the past.82 With an amendment to the Act

76

Id. at 1489-90.
One rarely thinks of insurance as being a driver towards purchasing something on the open market. For example,
when shopping for a new vehicle, insurance does not drive a buyer to purchase a specific vehicle. The price of
insurance premiums may discourage the purchase of a particular type of car, such as a sports car. However, as it will
be made clear, the way private insurance functions would not motivate a buyer to purchase a specific good.
78
Insurance works by spreading risk among a number of policy holders. However, the two attempts at private flood
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being passed in 1973, all housing that was federally financed, regulated, insured or supervised
was required to purchase flood insurance.83
Besides being federally subsidized, there are several other components to the NFIP which
prohibit it from managing risks. The NFIP cannot reject high-risk applicants from purchasing
flood insurance.84 The result of such a policy led to the NFIP insuring applicants who would
otherwise be denied coverage if flood insurance was managed by private insurers. Furthermore,
the NFIP cannot drop policy holders who file multiple and frequent claims.85 This results in
repetitive loss properties, further putting a strain on the program. Finally, the NFIP cannot
increase premium rates to recoup losses or to reflect the true risks associated with flooding given
that the program is subject to statutory limits on rate increases.86 These aspects of the NFIP,
combined with federally-subsidized premium rates, were put into effect to protect those who own
property in flood prone areas, such as the Jersey shore. In its current form, the NFIP further
exacerbates the problems caused by strong coastal storms such as hurricanes.

III.

COASTAL DEVELOPMENT MEETS MOTHER NATURE IN BRIGANTINE AND
BEYOND.

It is often said that storms are only disasters due to human action.87 While man did not
create Hurricane Sandy on October 22, 201288, it was the construction of buildings, roads, and
other structures that led to the tremendous damage that ensued. This super-storm aimed its
83
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deadly winds and storm surge right for the beaches of New Jersey, making landfall on October
29th near Brigantine89 during one of the most dangerous times in the regions tidal schedule,
during both high tide and spring tide.90 This storm surge brought large quantities of ocean water
towards the main land.91 While the beach works as a natural buffer against a storm surge, when
objects are built upon this buffer, damage is sustained.92 It has been estimated that Sandy
inflicted $36.9 billion in damages directly on the state of New Jersey, with most of that damage
being concentrated in the coastal regions.93 Housing damaged by the storm in New Jersey will
cost $4.9 billion to repair, while damaged businesses will cost an additional $8.3 billion.94 These
costs do not take into account the damage caused indirectly by Sandy which weakened coastal
defenses against other storms.95
In the months following Hurricane Sandy, the battle cry “Rebuild!” could be heard
throughout New Jersey, especially in areas whose economic base was ravaged by the storm.96
Besides pressure from homeowners and businesses, politicians were feeling the pressure from
89
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the thought of decreased tax revenue. Soon after landfall, Governor Chris Christie used
emotional references to spur the rebuilding effort, stating that the Jersey shore is “…a part of the
cultural heartbeat of our state”.97 While recognizing that decisions regarding rebuilding needed
to be well thought out, certain stop-gap construction commenced soon after the storm passed in
order to mitigate damages and allow emergency and aid vehicles into affected areas.98
The first thoughtful steps regarding rebuilding New Jersey’s coastal areas have been
taken by FEMA. Before Hurricane Sandy, the flood maps in place across the coastal region of
New Jersey dated from the 1980s.99 In order to augment these outdated Flood Insurance Rate
Maps (FIRMS), FEMA released Advisory Base Flood Elevation (ABEFs)100 maps to aid in the
reconstruction effort.101 These new ABEF maps cover 194 coastal municipalities in New
Jersey.102 Zoning and building codes have been exposed by the ABEF as being grossly outdated
by not reflecting the increased risk of flooding in coastal areas since the 1980s.103 While these
maps are advisory, with the official flood maps being unveiled at a later date, the state of New
Jersey has already adopted the ABEF maps, incorporating them into rebuilding efforts.104 By
accepting these new advisory flood maps, homes that have been substantially damaged by
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Hurricane Sandy must be elevated in accordance with the flood maps.105 To encourage residents
in coastal regions to raise their damaged structures to meet compliance levels, both a carrot and a
stick have been offered. FEMA has offered up to $30,000 to help offset the costs of raising a
building to meet its current ABFE map levels.106 Those who do not comply with the new
advisory maps may see an increase in their flood insurance premium.107
Raising a home to be in compliance with flood maps does not solve the problem of over
development in dangerous flood prone areas. However, such a program exists within the state of
New Jersey to solve this problem and Governor Chris Christie has offered it as a way for
homeowners to eliminate almost all possibility of coastal storm damage. Run by the New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection, the Blue Acres Program was established in 1995 to
distribute “grants and loans to municipalities and counties who acquire lands in coastal areas that
have been damaged by storms, that may be prone to storm damage, or that buffer or protect other
lands from storm damage”.108 When the Act was passed in 1995, the program was funded with
$9 million for post-storm purchases.109 By purchasing property in the area in which the Coastal
Blue Acre Program operates110, the state can help reduce damage caused by storms by both
105
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removing people from hazardous areas as well as increasing the beaches natural buffering
abilities.111 This program, however, can only be one tool in the states tool box in dealing with
reckless coastal development.112 The Blue Acre Program relies on state funding to carry out its
mission. In a cash-strapped state that is still recovering from an economic recession, it is unlikely
that New Jersey can afford to purchase the large amount of coastal land needed to be effective in
thwarting coastal storm damage.

IV.

OBSTACLES TO REAL CHANGE
A.

THE LACK OF WILL IN NEW JERSEY POLITICS REPRESENTS A REAL
THREAT TO PROTECTING THE COAST OF NEW JERSEY.

While real steps have previously been taken to protect the New Jersey shore, Hurricane
Sandy offers an opportunity to move forward by leaps and bounds to truly protect the people of
coastal New Jersey and to restore the beaches and their ability to protect the coast by
implementing responsible land management plans. However, along with having the first heavily
developed beach area comes the glue in the political gears which makes meaningful change slow
and difficult. Nowhere is this as true in terms of coastal damage protection as with land use
regulation. Political will to effectuate change is always shifting and fluid, due to the substantial
tax revenue brought in by coastal tourism and placed into state and local municipal coffers.113
Furthermore, there is an entrenched “shore culture” in New Jersey which would push back
against any perceived threat to the beach lifestyle.114
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111
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The biggest obstacle to changing coastal land management and having it reflect coastal
flood conditions is local politics. Where a social group of people share a common aim or goal,
such as people involved in coastal areas, interest groups form to protect their member’s
objectives.115 Due to the desirability of living by the beach and the resulting high property
values, the interests at the New Jersey shore tend to be financially well off.116 As a financially
strong interest group, coastal residents can exert considerable influence on the legislature and
local politicians to protect their interests.117 This is especially true when they believe that their
common interests are threatened, especially when the status quo begins to shift.
When a tragedy on the scale of Hurricane Sandy hits, communities rally together. As
stated previously, this is the precise time that the shore interests mobilize to secure their interests
when their way of life seems threatened.118 These strong interests will often make it an almost
impossible task for state and local government to effect change.119 If one was to accept this
“strong interest group” logic then government would rarely act with proper diligence in changing
coastal law following a coastal disaster. This problem is further exacerbated in New Jersey given
the levels of government that control coastal land use. CAFRA requires that permits be obtained
from the State for construction in certain defined coastal regions.120 However, the remaining
lands are all zoned by municipalities, including coastal lands not covered by CAFRA.121 As local
government officials are elected by the constituents in their respective areas, the strong coastal
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development interest has effectively no group to counter its influence when it comes to elected
representatives and the land management laws they lobby for.122
While coastal residents and businesses have an interest in rebuilding and further
developing the New Jersey shore, the largest obstacle to real change regarding costal
management is the interest of the entire state of New Jersey. The amount of damage caused by
Hurricane Sandy in terms of dollars is staggering, yet so is the tax revenue that beach tourism
brings into the state. As of 2011, the tourism industry in New Jersey supported 486,000 jobs and
contributed $4.4 billion in state and local taxes.123 While New Jersey has various tourist
attractions, the shore is by far the strongest contributor to tourism dollars in the state. Of all the
tourism dollars generated, more than 72 percent came directly from Atlantic County, Cape May
County, Ocean County, and Monmouth County.124 It is no coincidence that these four counties
make up the Shore region in New Jersey.125 The importance of the New Jersey shore to the
tourism industry is well known, as the beach attracts vacationers and the New Jersey shore “is
less than one tank of gas from more than one-quarter of the U.S. population”.126 Suggesting a
change in the way that coastal construction and land management is implemented would be a
tough pill to swallow due to the possibility of a reduction in tax revenue. Reducing beach
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construction may be the responsible action in terms of beach sustainability and building
protection but forgoing tax revenue in a cash-strapped state during a slow economic recovery
may not be a plan embraced by those in New Jersey who benefit from tourism dollars, namely
the entire state.
It is always difficult to pass legislation that aims to prevent activities that people actively
enjoy. As early as 1802, people have been visiting the New Jersey shore to take advantage of its
recreational attributes.127 The measures that have been taken to ensure the long term enjoyment
of the shore have been extensive, from the creation of seawalls to the replenishment of eroding
beaches.128 Changing existing land use laws and eliminating incentives for construction at the
beach eliminates some of the satisfaction and enjoyment that comes from visiting Point Pleasant,
Long Beach Island, or any of the other coastal towns in New Jersey. This is not to say that we
should abolish or even limit peoples use or access to the beach. However, by reducing the
number of businesses and shore houses, people will inevitably enjoy the beach less. With a
reduction in the number of restaurants to go to, the amount of time spent at the beach will, in
turn, decline. Reducing the construction of boardwalks will also reduce the amusement and
entertainment that is essential to the shore experience in New Jersey. By reducing home
construction in coastal flood areas, the convenience of living at the beach will be diminished.
People desire to live and operate businesses at the beach, despite the risks.129 This desire is so
strong that people will pay a premium on coastal land to take advantage of being near the beach.
Given this long established yearning to live, visit, and work at the beach, inhibiting peoples
abilities to do so poses a great barrier to effecting change in coastal development management.
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B.

SUBSIDIZED FLOOD INSURANCE ENCOURAGES COASTAL
DEVELOPMENT AND DOES NOT COLLECT ENOUGH IN PREMIUMS TO
REMAIN FINANCIALLY OPERATABLE.

While private insurance normally reflects actual risk, flood insurance is a subsidy which
is passed on along to the consumer of flood insurance, namely those who own structures in flood
plains.130 The program is neither actuarially sound in practice or in theory. A moral hazard
problem is created by people over-investing in coastal properties that are subject to incredible
damage because they are not shouldering the full burden of the risk associated with living in a
coastal flood zone.131 The federal government and the taxpayers are financially responsible for
the risks that homeowners in flood zones do not bear. However, this subsidy is required for the
program to exist at all. Without the subsidy, flood insurance would be prohibitively expensive
due to the adverse selection problem inherent in national flood insurance.132 In 1990, the U.S.
House of Representatives attempted to remedy this problem slightly by passing a bill which
would have deprived people who lived in flood prone coastal areas of flood insurance.133
However, for reasons that this paper cannot cover in sufficient amount, the subsidy that is built
into the National Flood Insurance Program cannot be eliminated. Needless to say, flood
insurance would be too expensive to purchase if there was no built-in subsidy.
The internal structure of the National Flood Insurance Program also prevents substantive
change in coastal management. As previously stated, the program’s rate increases must follow
statutorily prescribed limits.134 This prevents the NFIP from recovering after years in which a
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large number of claims were made.135 With a borrowing capacity of only $2.9 billion, the
damage that the program will have to pay out due to Hurricane Sandy is likely to cause the NFIP
to become financially stressed.136 While the program collects about $3.5 billion in premiums per
year, Sandy is on pace to cost over $7 billion137 in payouts.138 Besides operating in the red, the
NFIP cannot drop those who file claims for repeated flooding.139 These customers often live in
highly risky areas and cost the program multiples of what their property is worth.140 It is
irresponsible for taxpayers to continue to accept the burden of rebuilding such properties.
Without substantial changes to the way the NFIP is operated, the program will continue to act as
a subsidy, drawing people in to risk prone properties.

V.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

With rising sea levels, increased coastal construction, and the prediction of more frequent
powerful storms, CAFRA is not ideal in its current iteration. In combating the issues present in
New Jersey’s coastal land use management, the state legislature will have to act rationally. A
135
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balanced approach needs to be implemented that would balance, on one side, a strong tourism
sector anchored in the coastal regions, tax revenue growth, and keeping the New Jersey shore
culture alive balanced with the need to protect the states beaches.141 While preventing rebuilding
outright would appear to solve the problem of risky coastal development, this could be
considered a taking by the state for which property owners would need to be compensated.142 As
previously discussed, when disaster strikes, an elected body will be unable to make rational
decisions and instead will often fall victim to interest groups.143 Therefore, the best course of
action would be to wait until the effects of a coastal natural disaster, such as Hurricane Sandy,
are fully understood and appreciated before making changes to CAFRA. While this may sound
like a request to “kick the ball downfield” and let another group of legislators deal with these
contentious issues, this plan would weaken coastal interests and allow well thought out plans to
take shape. A set time table must be put into place so as to allow enough time for damages to be
assessed and weaknesses brought to light, but not too long to allow the people of New Jersey to
forget the destruction that can occurs when the sea meets the state.144
Any future plan that even appears to be infringing on shore residents and businesses
enjoyment of the beach would inevitably lead to push back from coastal interests.145 The key to
convincing these interests, as well as the state as a whole, lies in educating the public about the
141
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risks that exist if New Jersey stays the course. The first step towards educating the public is to
obtain the information and statistics that are necessary to fully grasp the consequences of living
near the New Jersey shore. This information can be used to show coastal homeowners that flood
risks are not simply random or an “acts of God” and that planning for such storms is not futile.146
In order to obtain this information, a study similar to the 1981 New Jersey Master Plan147 should
be conducted by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. While previous
studies have been conducted by the state regarding population areas adjacent to the coast, a
modern study is warranted given the recent destruction seen at the Jersey shore. This study
would focus on the science of coastal geomorphology148, the history of natural disasters affecting
the New Jersey coast, New Jersey’s response to such disasters, and the effects and consequences
of these responses. This study would also explore the routes that other coastal states have taken
to protect their beaches and citizens. 149 For while all beaches are distinct, similarities exist and
the collective experiences of all coastal residents could lead to more effective practices within
New Jersey. Furthermore, while such a study would fully inform those who read it, more
practical action is needed. After such a study is completed, a reasonable timetable should be set
for legislative action based on its findings.150 This would ensure that such a broad study would

146

See generally Poirier, supra note 78, at 279.
See generally NEW JERSEY DEPT. OF ENVTL. PROT., I NEW JERSEY SHORE PROTECTION MASTER PLAN,
224.N5N47 (1981).
148
Geomorphology is defined as “a science that deals with the relief features of the earth or of another celestial body
(as the moon) and seeks a genetic interpretation of them”. Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/geomorphology (last visited Apr. 26, 2013).
149
For example, the California Coastal Act requires that any person that develops in a coastal zone must obtain a
permit from the California Coastal Commission while hearing input from local authorities. Under the Coastal Area
Management Act, North Carolina has given authority to the Coastal Resources Commission which adopts standards
for each county to follow in the development and implementation of development and zoning plans. See e.g. Tricia
A. Sherick, A Comparison of the Coastal Zone Management Policies of the Atlantic and Pacific Coastal Regions
Versus Programs Implemented in Selected Great Lakes States, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 459, 473-74 (1997).
150
At the very least, the state legislature should amend CAFRA so its coverage is extended. Given the important role
of barrier islands and their natural movement, CAFRA needs to cover all barrier islands in New Jersey. Ideally, the
state would set up a commission that would deal with all land use plans on the barrier islands, hearing suggestions
147

26

Matthew Oorbeek 27

not be discarded and the legislature would be forced to recognize the current problems with the
regulation of coastal areas.
A timeline of destructive natural events should be included in every deed of property
located within coastal flood plains. While a legislative study is important and vital to
understanding the current risks associated with living in coastal flood plains as well as
formulating effective policies for such regions, these studies take time and people will rebuild
and repopulate the New Jersey coast in the interim. A more immediate remedial action that can
be put into effect quickly is a requirement that would educate the coastal public on past damage
caused by natural disasters. The Department of Environmental Protection would prepare a simple
document which would succinctly list natural disasters that have impacted a given area within a
defined time period.151 This list of damaging events must require the property owner to
acknowledge, by initialing, each event. This would ensure that at the very least, property owners
would be informed of the dangers of owning a particular piece of property.152 Such a list would
help prevent developers from downplaying the risks associated with living near the beach.153 The
scope of this document requirement would be fairly limited and would only apply to those
properties located within CAFRA regulated areas. If CAFRA is amended to expand its reach, as
I propose, the document requirement would reach these new properties. This document

from the local municipalities. This would give the state the flexibility it needs to tackle this important problem while
being slightly more removed from the local politics compared to local municipal governments.
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such documents. Furthermore, the period of events that the document would cover is very important. Too short of a
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requirement would provide for immediate protective remedies while the Department of
Environmental Protection study is under way.
In order to reduce risky development in coastal flood areas, the subsidy created by the
NFIP also needs to be reduced. While a complete elimination of subsidized flood insurance is
unworkable154, a reduction in the subsidy is needed to both reduce risky development and keep
the program financially sustained. In order to accomplish this, the NFIP needs be given the tools
to balance its risks in a fashion similar to how private insurance operates without subjecting the
program fully to free market forces.
One of the problems related to the NFIP that is in dire need of fixing is the programs
inability to drop policy holders, even if they submit multiple claims in a short period. These
policy holders are among the most risky and cost the program millions of dollars.155 Rebuilding
these properties that are constantly destroyed represents a drain on the NFIP’s finances. One
solution to this problem that should be implemented in New Jersey is to only allow a property to
rebuild a certain amount of times over a defined time period. After that number has been
reached, the NFIP would give a final payout on the condition that the property be rebuilt outside
of federally designated flood areas.156 This would protect the NFIP’s financials and also
encourage property owners to move away from dangerous coastal flood lands.
Finally, the NFIP needs the flexibility that private insurers have in increasing insurance
premiums. With the statutory limitation on premium increases combined with the limited amount
of debt the program can take on, it is easy to see how the NFIP can become financially stressed
154
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following a large disaster. This flexibility would increase the cost of flood insurance and make
premium prices more volatile. Inevitably, this reduces the subsidy that coastal land owners enjoy.
However, these changes are necessary if the NFIP is to continue to exist. With the stresses
caused by Hurricane Katrina still impacting the program, things only appear to be getting worse
for the program.157 The NFIP needs flexibility in dealing with its policy holders, especially as the
federal government continues to deal with budget constraints and as powerful storms become
more frequent.

VI.

CONCLUSION:
The coast makes up a large portion of New Jersey’s state economy, from housing to

tourism.158 Yet this area took a destructive hit when Hurricane Sandy made land fall, wiping out
businesses, homes, and large portions of the beach.159 This destruction would have been severely
mitigated if the state had a responsible land use management plan in effect in the coastal flood
plain areas. The function of barrier islands has been known for quite some time, specifically their
role in protecting the main land from storm surges created by coastal storms.160 However,
buildings constructed on these barriers islands often suffer severe damage when the islands are
hit with strong storm surges.161
While New Jersey has had a coastal land management plan in place for some time,
CAFRA contained gaping loopholes which allowed residential construction to continue with

157

See Eric Lipton et al., supra note 138.
See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
159
See supra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
160
See supra note 92.
161
See PILKEY & DIXON, supra note 3, at 27.
158

29

Matthew Oorbeek 30

little state oversight.162 Furthermore, the NFIP had provided for subsidized flood insurance
which further made coastal living more affordable, desirable, and less risky.163 In order for New
Jersey to move forward responsibly with rebuilding efforts, both programs need major overhauls
in the way they are structured and the areas that they serve. Unfortunately various obstacles stand
in the way for meaningful change. Further state regulation of coastal flood areas will be blocked
by local politics, fear of losing tax revenue, and the lack of appreciation of the dangers associated
with living near the beach.164 Small changes, dealing mainly with educating property owners, are
possible and would educate people about the dangers related with living in coastal flood areas.165
If properly heeded, this education could stem the tide of coastal construction. The NFIP has its
own structural problems that need to be overcome including their inability to drop policy
holders, the need for subsidized insurance premiums, and the programs inability to raise
premiums in the ways private insurance can.166 Without these changes, the NFIP will suffer by in
being in a financially unworkable situation that will perpetuate over time as more coastal storms
inflict damage on the country.167 If New Jersey simply rebuilds, without thoughtful consideration
on the programs that have thus far driven people to risky areas, a disaster similar to Hurricane
Sandy will inevitably happen again including the loss of property and life.
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